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June 24, 2014.1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, international ﬁnancial institu-
tions (IFIs) and donor agencies promoted two major institu-
tional reform initiatives in the urban water and sanitation
(W&S) sector of the developing world. The ﬁrst major reform
was decentralization, the vertical transfer of administrative
responsibility for service provision from central to subnational
governments. At least 41 countries decentralized W&S services
to subnational governments starting in the 1980s. A second
major type of institutional reform, which we term insulating
reforms, involved a horizontal transfer of administrative
responsibility for W&S to legally independent service provid-
ers that were designed to be shielded from the direct inﬂuence
of politicians. Many developing countries also adopted insu-
lating reforms in recent decades. For example, water utilities
in at least 35 countries were “corporatized”, or legally estab-
lished as independent and ﬁscally autonomous public entities
with a corporate board structure. In addition, 61 countries
privatized at least one metropolitan W&S system, thereby pro-
viding for an even greater level of independence than under
corporatization. Decentralization and insulating reforms in
the urban W&S sector formed a part of the international
development community’s broader emphasis on institutional
reform during the neoliberal era. 1
Surprisingly, these twin reforms—and especially interactions
between them—have received little scholarly scrutiny. While
privatization (Bakker, 2010; Budds & McGranahan, 2003;
Davis, 2005; Lobina, 2005; Prasad, 2006) and the broader pol-
icy consensus regarding global water policy and Integrated
Water Resources Management (IWRM) (Abers, 2007; Abers
& Keck, 2009; Biswas, 2004; Conca, 2006; Goldman, 2007;
Lemos & de Oliveira, 2004; Wester, Merrey, & de Lange,
2003; Wilder & Romero Lankao, 2006) have received a great
deal of attention, the decentralization of urban W&S services
and insulating reforms other than privatization–such as
corporatization–have received less treatment in the literature.621This paper examines the promotion of both decentralization
and insulating reforms by international institutions, their
widespread—and often simultaneous—adoption in the devel-
oping world, and experiences to-date with both reforms. In
particular, we examine whether these reforms led to changes
in the degree of political inﬂuence on service providers, given
that promoters of both decentralization and insulation argued
that such changes would enable improvements in service qual-
ity and coverage. However, while IFIs and donor agencies
advocated both types of reforms, their recommendations were
based on conﬂicting assumptions about the eﬀects of political
inﬂuence on service outcomes.
Reform proponents argued that decentralization would
increase user inﬂuence upon policymaking in the sector, which
would in turn help provide political support for raising more
revenue from users that could be used to improve service pro-
vision. In contrast, proponents of insulating reforms argued
that granting utilities legal autonomy would decrease political
inﬂuences upon providers, and thereby increase operational
autonomy in practice. Reducing political intervention would
allow providers to adopt cost recovery, or commercialization
policies, that would increase revenues available for mainte-
nance and investment, and thereby enable improvements in
service quality and coverage. 2 Taken together, these ratio-
nales rested upon conﬂicting views about how politics aﬀects
service provision. Decentralization proponents considered
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services, whereas advocates for corporatization and privatiza-
tion saw citizen inﬂuence—mediated by political authorities—
as an impediment to improving services.
The nascent empirical literature on both types of reform
suggests that this tension in reform rationale has led to disap-
pointing outcomes. Our review of cases in which decentraliza-
tion and insulating reforms were adopted in tandem suggests
that bringing service provision “closer to the people” and
inviting greater citizen participation has made it diﬃcult to
shield utilities management from politics, and particularly
from political opposition to cost recovery measures. Adminis-
trative decentralization increases the salience of W&S policy; it
becomes one of a few major local policy areas in which politi-
cians can cater to citizens. 3 Particularly in democratic and
quasi-democratic settings, this discourages politicians from
implementing controversial policies, even if they would con-
tribute to the ﬁscal sustainability and quality and reach of util-
ity services in the long run. The short length of municipal
administrations, which can be as brief as three or four years
in many developing countries, can exacerbate this problem
(Pineda Pablos & Brisen˜o Ramı´rez, 2012, p. 200; Herrera,
2014). While corporatization and privatization provided for
de jure independence of service providers, these reforms usu-
ally could not shield service providers from political cam-
paigns against cost recovery policies. The tension between
decentralization and insulating reforms was magniﬁed because
they were adopted in political systems with few institutional
checks and balances—contexts where political economy the-
ory predicts “insulation” should be particularly diﬃcult to
achieve. Our ﬁndings therefore suggest that scholarly and pol-
icy debates regarding the eﬀects of corporatization and privati-
zation should pay greater attention to whether or not services
had been previously decentralized as decentralization may
make it diﬃcult to insulate service provision in practice.
Our ﬁndings also suggest revisions to existing scholarly
arguments regarding the eﬀects of decentralization and other
types of institutional reform. First, scholarship on decentral-
ization has stressed that citizen participation encourages
elected oﬃcials to focus on citizen interests (Blair, 2000;
Crook & Manor, 1998; Fiszbein, 1997; Ribot, 2002; Wunsch
& Olowu, 1996). While scholars have demonstrated how the
theorized beneﬁts of decentralization can be impeded by a
range of factors in practice, such as corruption
(Prud’homme, 1995, p. 211; Veron, Williams, Corbridge, &
Srivastava, 2006), poor institutional design (Agrawal &
Gupta, 2005; Goldfrank, 2007), elite capture (Bardhan,
2002), and insuﬃcient devolution of authority and funding
(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Boone, 2003), many studies consider
a central goal of decentralization to be increased participation,
assuming this will improve the accountability of elected oﬃ-
cials. Few studies, however, have noted that citizens may be
more likely to mobilize to protest immediate, concrete losses
rather than encourage policymakers to prioritize policies that
could potentially yield important beneﬁts in the long run. 4
Such tendencies are likely to be particularly strong in much
of the developing world, where citizens often lack conﬁdence
that governments will actually deliver on commitments that
take years to realize, such as investments in infrastructure.
Second, studying the interactions between these two reform
waves contributes to an important debate on the political
economy of development. A nascent literature examining the
eﬀects of institutional “transplants” from the developed to
the developing world (Andrews, 2013; Evans, 2004; Rodrik,
2007; Weyland, 2009) suggests that reforms may have unin-
tended consequences in new settings. This literature, however,has not yet examined explicitly the ways in which institutional
reforms interact with one another and how such interactions
can help explain reform consequences.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the ﬁrst half of the paper,
we examine the historical foundations of reforms in the W&S
sector. We ﬁrst explain the context in which decentralization
and insulating reforms were adopted by describing status-
quo patterns of service provision in the developing world prior
to the reform wave. Next, we show how policy reports written
by analysts within IFIs, as well as oﬃcial policy statements,
oﬀered the two conﬂicting diagnoses of the source of under-
performance in W&S—an observation that, to the best of
our knowledge, has not been made in the literature. We then
provide the most complete documentation to-date of the
extent to which decentralization and insulating reforms were
subsequently undertaken in the W&S sector of developing
countries. This analysis is based on an extensive review of
IFI policy documents, primary sources from a range of coun-
tries, and academic publications. The second half of the paper
examines the emerging academic literature regarding the out-
comes of both reforms. Our analysis of the cases and aggre-
gate trends suggests that when insulating reforms have been
adopted following decentralization, tensions emerge. We ﬁnd
that popular participation and local electoral politics often
deter the adoption of cost recovery measures, and may even
prevent the adoption of insulating reforms such as corporati-
zation and privatization.2. THE PRE-REFORM LANDSCAPE
Prior to the reform wave of the 1980s and 1990s, developing
countries commonly managed W&S systems through national
bureaucracies. While many countries managed their W&S sys-
tems locally prior to World War II (often due to constitutional
mandates), many national governments centralized W&S
management alongside other services during the post-war per-
iod (Perard, 2007; Smith, 2004, p. 377). This centralized model
of infrastructure management yielded impressive rates of ser-
vice access by the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America, Asia,
and the Middle East, thanks in part to countries’ trade sur-
pluses and access to international ﬁnance during the ﬁrst dec-
ades after WWII, which were used to ﬁnance expansion
eﬀorts. 5 For example, 57% of urban households in Bolivia
and 60% of urban households in Jordan had household con-
nections by 1962. 6 In Africa, however, national bureaucracies
were formed later, and while many post-independence bureau-
cracies did invest in expanding services, economic crises under-
mined the ability of national bureaucracies to expand services
service enough to redress inequalities in access dating from the
colonial era (Bayliss, 2008b, p. 101; Nilsson & Kaijser, 2009, p.
279; Smith, 2004, p. 377; Wunsch, 1990).
Problems emerged with the centralized model by the 1970s
and 1980s. First, national bureaucracies and state-owned
enterprises often prioritized new infrastructure, including
new household connections, at the expense of system mainte-
nance. 7 Without adequate maintenance, water losses grew to
2–3 times the rate observed in developed countries (World
Bank, 1994b, p. 27). At the same time, governments found it
politically diﬃcult to increase the rates charged to consumers
to keep up with inﬂation. This proved especially diﬃcult given
the high inﬂation rates generated by the post-war, import sub-
stitution industrialization (ISI) model. 8 And within political
systems dominated by patronage politics, state agencies often
failed to enforce payment of these increasingly low, oﬃcial
charges. 9 As tariﬀ revenues became increasingly insuﬃcient
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tem costs out of national coﬀers rather than user fees. 10 This
model of infrastructure ﬁnance became diﬃcult to sustain
when governments’ access to ﬁnance decreased in the wake
of the 1980s debt crisis, which resulted in a sudden lending
freeze to developing countries. 11
This combination of factors led in many cases to a vicious
cycle of underperformance that Savedoﬀ and Spiller termed
a “low-level equilibrium,” characterized by low tariﬀs, low
consumer expectations regarding service quality, and low con-
sumer willingness to pay—which in turn detracted from funds
that might have been reinvested in water systems (1999, pp.
13–17). Turning to national data on system coverage from
the 1990s in Table 1, we can see that many developing coun-
tries still possessed large coverage gaps prior to the wave of
institutional reforms, particularly with respect to sanitation.
Although comparative data are sparse and diﬃcult to inter-
pret, 12 case evidence suggests that cross-national data tend
to overstate existing levels of access. Service quality problems
continue to plague even the most extensive systems in the
developing world due to low-level equilibria. Meanwhile,
many households living outside the service areas of these
large-scale state providers relied on small-scale service provid-
ers, such as user-owned cooperatives and private water ven-
dors. Private vendors in particular often charged prices
many times higher than those levied by state agencies
(Estache, Gomez-Lobo, & Leipziger, 2001, p. 1185).3. THE IFI INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AGENDA
Policymakers at IFIs and donor agencies formulated their
responses to the poor performance of the developing world’s
urban W&S providers in the context of a broad shift in eco-
nomic development approaches that occurred during the late
1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, policymakers at Washing-
ton-based institutions such as the IMF and World Bank
reached a consensus on the need for economic adjustment pol-
icies such as trade liberalization, labor market and ﬁnancial
deregulation, privatization of ineﬃcient state-owned enter-
prises, and the redirection of public spending toward human
capital investment (Williamson, 1990). During the same per-
iod, policymakers at these organizations promoted other types
of institutional reforms intended to provide eﬀective founda-
tions for market activity (e.g., legal reforms, enforcing prop-
erty rights) and increase the eﬀectiveness of public sector
institutions. In this context, decentralization and public sector
reforms such as corporatization were promoted across a wide
range of contexts and policy arenas (Andrews, 2013;
Camdessus, 1997, 1999; Grindle, 2007, pp. 4–5). As part of a
broader neoliberal reform program, these varied recommenda-
tions shared a common assumption that institutions provide
incentives for and constraints upon the behavior of politicalTable 1. Water and sanitation coverag
Improved water
source (%)
Urban
improve
High-income country average 99.2
Upper middle-income country average 86
Lower middle-income country average 70.8
Low-income country average 53.9
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2009).
Note: “Improved water source” refers to sources that, by nature of their c
contamination.and economic actors, and that institutional changes would
therefore generate important real world consequences.
Policy analysts and program oﬃcers based at IFIs and
donor agencies came to attribute deﬁciencies of highly central-
ized and subsidized W&S systems to two incentive problems
by the early 1990s. On the one hand, proponents of decentral-
ization employed a critique applied in many public policy
areas, arguing that systems were managed at too far a distance
from the citizens who consumed their services. This distance
meant that citizens had few opportunities to pressure provid-
ers to deliver services of better quality. Citizens also had lim-
ited opportunities to voice their opinions about services or
reforms, which meant services failed to match the needs of
consumers and citizens would be unlikely to buy into reforms.
On the other hand, advocates of insulating reforms (e.g., cor-
poratization and privatization) argued that systems needed to
be “depoliticized,” or shielded from the direct inﬂuence of
elected oﬃcials, because politicians tended to divert resources
away from investment and impede eﬀorts to raise suﬃcient
tariﬀ revenue to fund basic maintenance and investment. This
section of the paper documents how these diagnoses were used
to justify these two types of institutional reforms. This analysis
is based on an exhaustive review of all electronic and print
documentation (policy documents, lending programs, reports,
and research) published by the following international institu-
tions during 1990–2000: the World Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, UN-Habitat and US-AID, which pro-
vide a clear sense of the rationales for reforms promoted by
the main lending institutions and donor agencies in the sector.
Our analysis highlights the tension between the rationales used
to justify both types of reforms, and demonstrates that decen-
tralizing and insulating reforms were often promoted and
adopted in tandem, despite the clear conﬂict.(a) Reform program 1: decentralization
By the mid-1990s, a consensus had emerged in the interna-
tional lending and donor community: the underperformance
of national water bureaucracies could be explained, at least in
part, by providers’ distance from local communities and
individuals. 13 This led major lenders and donors to advocate
transferringW&S service responsibility to lower tiers of govern-
ment. Figure 1 provides a simple conceptual representation of
the administrative decentralization of W&S services. In order
to distinguish it from insulating reforms, we emphasize the ver-
tical nature of the transfer of service responsibility from higher
tiers of government to subnational governments. 14 While
donors and funding agencies varied in the respective weight that
they placed upon decentralization and insulating reforms, 15 the
decentralization program enjoyed broad-based support.e by country income level in 1990
population with
d water source (%)
Improved
sanitation (%)
Urban population with
improved sanitation (%)
99.7 99.5 99.9
95.4 75.6 86
93.3 39.3 62
86.3 25 48
onstruction or through active intervention, are protected from outside
Figure 1. Institutional reforms in the W&S sector: decentralization versus insulating reforms.
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papers published by international lenders outlined a number
of reasons why bringing service management closer to the
people would improve system performance, often echoing
arguments used to advocate decentralization in other policy
areas. First, increasing local stakeholder participation in sec-
tor policy-making could improve the responsiveness of provid-
ers to local preferences and conditions (Bird, 1994, pp. 13–14;
Fox, 1994, p. 54; Kessides, 1993, p. 24; Schu¨beler, 1996, p. 57;
World Bank, 1994a, p. 4). Second, decentralizing services
would help raise awareness about the importance of water
planning and resource constraints. 16 Third, eﬀorts to intro-
duce cost recovery policies were more likely to succeed when
individuals felt they could actually inﬂuence project design
and resource allocation (Black, 1998, pp. 31, 64; U.N.
Habitat, 1993, pp. 8–9; World Bank, 1994b, p. 76).
Importantly, these policy documents noted that decentral-
ization eﬀorts were only likely to succeed when central govern-
ments provided local governments with suﬃcient funds, policy
autonomy, and staﬀ training programs (Bird, 1994, p. 4; Fox,
1994, p. 56 onward; World Bank, 1994b, p. 75). Most studies
sponsored by the donor community advocated a multi-tiered
institutional arrangement in which national governments pro-
vide funding for new infrastructure and set standards, regional
governments supervise local providers and provide training,
and local governments manage urban systems and collect fees
(Edwards, Rosensweig, & Salt, 1993, p. 3; World Bank, 1994b,
p. 75). 17 For decentralization to provide eﬃciency savings,
publications suggested that local service providers needed to
be suﬃciently large to enjoy economies of scale (Edwards
et al., 1993, p. 3; Fox, 1994, p. 55; Yepes, 1990, pp. 15–16).
Responding to ﬁnancial inducements from IFIs and aid
agencies, revenue constraints following the Latin American
debt crisis, and domestic political pressures following democra-
tization, many developing countries decentralized the adminis-
tration of their urban W&S systems starting in the 1980s. 18
Table 2 reports the results of our original data collection on
these W&S decentralization eﬀorts. 19 The table includes cases
of decentralization, deﬁned as when a centralized agency
was dismantled and services transferred to lower tiers ofgovernment, most commonly triggered by legal mandates such
as a constitutional amendment, a local services law, or amend-
ment to a national water law. 20 The table shows that the time
period during which diﬀerent regions decentralized varied, with
Latin American countries decentralizing earlier than their Cen-
tral Asian and African counterparts. Some countries chose to
decentralize administrative control for services to intermediate
tiers of government such as states or provinces, while others
devolved services to the municipal level. In contradiction to
the fairly nuanced policy analyses of decentralization cited in
the previous paragraphs, which stressed that decentralization
would likely only yield service improvements in the presence
of signiﬁcant economies of scale and suﬃcient local state
capacity, loan programs incentivized reforms in a wide set of
developing countries, including very small ones. Some impor-
tant countries that did not decentralize in recent decades
already administered services in a decentralized or deconcen-
trated 21 fashion (e.g., Bolivia, Brazil, and China). Even
countries that did not formally decentralize services, such as
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, often chose to decon-
centrate control in the sector, transferring employees of
centralized agencies to regional oﬃces. 22 By the end of the
reform wave, most developing countries managed W&S at
the subnational level or shared responsibilities between
national and subnational governments.
(b) Reform program 2: insulating service providers from politics
via corporatization and privatization
At the same time that lenders and donor agencies promoted
decentralization, policy analysts at the same institutions also
attributed problems in W&S to a “politicization” of utility
management. 23 According to these analyses, political interfer-
ence with managerial decisions and the conﬂation of political
and administrative roles kept water services trapped in a clien-
telist model of provision that privileged political over technical
or commercial management criteria. 24 It was argued that this
led to the following routine occurrences: elected oﬃcials
keeping prices low to cater to voters; the political tolerance of
widespread nonpayment; elected oﬃcials raiding utilities’ fee
Table 2. Water and sanitation decentralization in developing countries
Region & country Decentralization processa Tier of government administering service Sharing of service responsibility between tiers of governmentb
Latin America
Argentina Yes (1980) Intermediate (shared with local) 9 Provincial utilities, 1,235 urban water utilities, 365 urban W&S utilities
Bolivia No Local Major urban centers serviced by 25 local utilities, accounting for 55% of nation’s population
Brazil No Intermediate (shared with local) Major urban centers serviced by 27 state companies, accounting for 75% of nation’s population.
Remainder are serviced by municipalities (approx. 580), and 45 private utilities
Chile Yes (1988, 1990) Intermediate 13 Regional companies
Colombia Yes (1987) Local 70% of urban population served by 40 utilities; 1500 urban utilities total, 90 private utilities
Costa Rica No National (shared with local) In urban population, 72% served by national utility, 23% served by local utilities; 5%
independent providers
Dominican Republic No National (shared with intermediate) National utility serves 25 regions; remainder served by 6 regional autonomous utilities
Ecuador Yes (1992, 1994) Local National government continues to assist municipalities
El Salvador No National (shared with local) 84% of urban population served by national utility; others served by municipalities and mixed
capital ﬁrms
Guatemala No Local Many small local utilities, many municipalities serve directly
Honduras Yes (1991, 2003) Local 62% local; 38% national. Sanitation managed by municipalities with a few exceptions
(decentralization in process)
Mexico Yes (1980, 1983) Local (shared with intermediate) Mostly local providers, some inter-municipal and state utilities
Nicaragua No (attempts in 2006 failed) National (shared with local) Municipalities responsible but mostly served by national utility; 3 decentralized companies run
by private management contracts
Panama No National A multi-sector national company serves country
Paraguay No National National utility serves urban areas, coops common in rural areas, informal providers in capital
city
Peru Yes (1990) Local 136 Local utilities
Uruguay No National National (water and sanitation), Montevideo (sanitation)
Venezuela Yes (1989, 2001) Local (shared with intermediate) Municipalities responsible but mostly serviced by national company, 70% national and 30%
state/municipal (decentralization in process)
Asia
Cambodia No National
China No Local (shared with national) Cities supply water, supervised by National Water Resources Ministry
India Yes (1992) Local (shared with intermediate) Municipalities responsible, but states mostly service urban areas
Indonesia Yes (1987) Local National government assists municipalities
Malaysia Partial Intermediate (shared with national) National government owns assets, subnational provides service
Nepal Yes (1999) Local Local (shared with communities)
Philippines Yes (1973) Local (shared with intermediate) 400 semi-autonomous water districts; municipalities responsible for sanitation
Sri Lanka Partial (1987) National (sanitation shared with local) Semi-autonomous national water boards with deconcentrated operators, water service more
centralized than sanitation
Vietnam Partial (1999) Local (shared with national) Service is provided at the local level (decentralization in process)
Africa and Middle Eastc
Algeria No National National Water Agency oversees 26 deconcentrated operators
Benin No National National semi-autonomous public water and sanitation utility
Cameroon Partial (Ongoing) (2005) Local (shared with national)
Chad No National
Egypt Recentralization (2004) National National water company with deconcentrated local oﬃces
Ghana Partial Local (shared with national) National (water), local (sanitation)
Guinea Partial (2006) National (shared with local) Remains highly centralized
Kenya Yes (2002) Local
Madagascar Yes (1994) Local
(continued on next page)
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Table 2— (continued)
Region & country Decentralization processa Tier of government administering service Sharing of service responsibility between tiers of governmentb
Mali Yes (2002) Local (shared with national) National government continues to service urban areas through 8 deconcentrated regional
companies
Malawi No National
Morocco Yes (2002) Local
Namibia Yes (1992) Local (shared with national) National water company supplies bulk water to municipalities
Nigeria Partial (Ongoing) State (shared with national and local) 37 State water agencies responsible for water, 774 local governments responsible for sanitation,
(decentralization stalled)
Rwanda No National
Senegal No National
South Africa Yes (1997) Local
Tanzania No National 19 Urban water authorities are autonomous public bodies, but under legal jurisdiction of
Ministry
Togo No National
Uganda Partial (Ongoing) National (shared with local) National company serves 19 urban cities through deconcentrated oﬃces, (decentralization only
for small towns)
Zambia Yes (1997) Local (shared with intermediate) 10 intra-municipal companies, 22 local authorities deliver services
Yemen Yes (1996) Local 95% of urban population served by local utilities
Central Asia
Armenia Yes (1995) Local (shared with intermediate) Regionalization complete: 5 W&S regional operators serve 80% of population
Azerbaijan No National National company services 65% of population, 10% serviced by private operators, 25% by
individual households
Belarus No National
Georgia Yes (1990s) Local (shared with national) Regionalization complete: one national company serves country
Kazakhstan Yes (1990s) Local
Moldova Yes (1990s) Local Regionalization in progress
Russia Yes (1990s) Local
Tajikistan Yes (1990s) Local
Turkmenistan No National
Ukraine Yes (1990s) Local Regionalization in progress
Uzbekistan Yes (1990s) Local
Sources: Author elaboration (sources are included in the paper’s online Appendix A).
Note: All cases refer to decentralization of both water and sanitation unless otherwise indicated.
aWe deﬁne decentralization in urban W&S as a process of transferring service responsibility from federal to subnational governments. Our coding captures decentralization processes initiated after
1970, the most recent decentralization wave. This table therefore does not indicate that decentralization occurred for a number of countries with subnational government provision, where services were
administered by subnational governments prior to this most recent decentralization wave (e.g., Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, and China).
bWhere information available.
c In addition to the African countries included in this table, the following countries have also decentralized urban water services to subnational units but have been excluded due to a limited amount of
descriptive information regarding their decentralization processes: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan (Banerjee et al., 2008, 20, Appendix, p. 50).
626
W
O
R
L
D
D
E
V
E
L
O
P
M
E
N
T
CAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BOTH DECENTRALIZE AND DEPOLITICIZE URBAN WATER SERVICES? 627income for other purposes; politicians pressuring utility manag-
ers to make patronage appointments; and replacing a large
fraction of utility personnel following elections. This diagnosis
was consistent with a broader, and increasingly popular, set of
critiques of statist economic policy in developing countries,
which maintained that government policy and state-
owned enterprise management in particular was rendered inef-
fectual because of “rent-seeking” and conﬂicts between
commercial and political objectives. 25
A speciﬁc set of policy “solutions” followed logically from
this diagnosis of the underlying cause of poor service in the
sector, which we term insulating reforms. If shielded from
political pressures through institutional changes designed to
increase provider autonomy, managers would have more lee-
way to focus on medium- and long-run concerns, such as
the ﬁnancial and physical health of their utilities. While decen-
tralization entailed a vertical transfer of responsibility from
central to subnational governments, insulating reforms
involved horizontal transfers of responsibility from govern-
ment departments or ministries to legally and ﬁscally autono-
mous utilities (see Figure 1).
Figure 2 depicts the range of insulating reforms proposed by
policymakers at international institutions. At the more modest
end of the spectrum, services could be transferred from an exist-
ing multi-purpose public works department to a specialized
government department that could collect and retain its own
tariﬀ revenue and maintain a separate, departmental budget
and focus exclusively on water and/or sanitation services. Yet
more autonomy could be achieved through the establishment
of a “corporatized” utility that could take one of two forms.
Services could be transferred to a special purpose district
government with control over its own revenue stream and
budget; this would provide additional insulation, particularly
if appointments to the district board were non-coterminous
with those of the politicians appointing them. Yet more auton-
omy could be achieved through delegating service provision to
legally independent utilities, sometimes referred to as public
companies, fully or partially owned by the state. Finally, at
the end of the spectrum, services would bemost insulated if pro-
vision were outsourced to a private company or non-for-proﬁtFigure 2. Types of insulating reformsorganization. Reform proponents focused most heavily upon
these latter types of reform that Figure 2 refers to as “corpora-
tized” and “privatized providers.”
Lenders and donor agencies extolled the potential beneﬁts
of “corporatization,” as a means of improving the perfor-
mance of public sector operators. 26 IFI publications argued
that because corporatized utilities are legally distinct entities
from municipal or state governments their assets and revenue
streams are oﬃcially ring-fenced and budgets formally inde-
pendent. This means that while national sector policies would
continue to be set by a parent ministry, utility-speciﬁc policies
would be set by an autonomous governance structure, such as
an appointed or elected board of directors. This would serve to
shield operational decisions from political interference (Muir
& Saba, 1995; US-AID, 2005, p. 10; World Bank, 1994b, p.
37). More insulated from everyday political pressures and reli-
ant upon the utility’s own revenue stream than heads of gov-
ernment departments, managers of corporatized utilities
would have stronger incentives to employ technical and ﬁnan-
cial criteria in hiring decisions. They would also direct
resources to basic maintenance and investments important
for service quality and coverage in the medium and long run
(Kessides, 1993, p. 24; World Bank, 1994b, pp. 37–39). Man-
agers would also have strong interest in adopting “commer-
cialization” or “cost recovery” policies such as charging
rates that cover the costs of service and encouraging users to
pay their bills through greater attention to customer service
and imposing penalties for nonpayment (World Bank, 1993,
pp. 54–55, 1994b, p. 39). 27. In addition, by forcing consumers
to pay the costs proportional to the services received, utility
managers could “manage demand,” discouraging wasteful
consumption and making services more ﬁnancially and envi-
ronmentally sustainable. 28 Commonly promoted demand
management policies included raising water rates to cover
costs, water metering, suspending service for nonpayment,
eliminating clandestine connections, and improving system
maintenance to reduce the amount of water lost before
reaching consumers. 29 This type of public sector reform drew
on a broader literature stemming from new public
management (NPM) circles in the 1990s. 30in the water and sanitation sector.
628 WORLD DEVELOPMENTIFIs and academic analysts promoted a more dramatic var-
iant of these institutional reforms during the 1990s in the con-
text of the Washington Consensus reform package:
privatization, or “contracting out” for the management of
and/or investment in W&S systems to the private sector (see
column 5, Figure 2). Whereas corporatization involved setting
up legally autonomous providers with controlling stakes held
by the public sector, privatization involved delegating every-
day management of services to legally independent entities
controlled by private investors or other nongovernmental
actors. Discussion papers and policy reform documents pub-
lished by IFIs focused on delegation to private investors and
outlined a range of models involving varying levels of delega-
tion, and, by implication, insulation from political pressures.
While some contracts only delegated short-term responsibility
for the management of commercial aspects of service provision
(management contracts), more substantial shifts occurred
under concession contracts (long-term contracts for both man-
agement and investment in state-owned systems) and divesti-
tures (sales of equity in public utilities that own network
infrastructure to private investors) (Idelovitch & Ringskog,
1995, pp. 13–21; Kerf et al., 1998; Kessides, 1993; World
Bank, 1994b, p. 61). Reform advocates focused on the poten-
tial eﬃciency gains and increased revenue streams that could
be funneled into investment once system management was
insulated from politics. 31 Delegating management and invest-
ment functions to the private sector would insulate providers
from short-termist political pressures even more eﬀectively
than delegation to corporatized utilities because managers
would need to respond to shareholder (or other owners’) inter-
ests rather than oversight boards staﬀed by political appoin-
tees (Kessides, 1993, p. 30). This would give managers yet
more leeway to adopt “commercialization” policies designed
to help utilities recover the full costs of production and invest-
ment through tariﬀ revenue. Under the model promulgated by
IFIs, contracts with the private sector for the management of
and/or investment in state-owned systems were to be moni-
tored by new regulatory agencies, oﬃcially charged with
ensuring that both ﬁrms and governments met their
contractual obligations (Foster, 2005, pp. 10–23; Kessides,
1993, p. 23).
A large number of developing countries engaged in corpora-
tization eﬀorts over the last two decades. IFIs and donor agen-
cies often insisted upon the adoption of these reforms as a
condition for receiving loans to fund infrastructure projects.
This acted as an important carrot during the 1980s and
1990s—a period when developing countries had little access
to ﬁnance. 32 Domestic technocrats, however, were often just
as convinced of the promise of more corporate structures for
delivering services as sector specialists at the development
banks. Case studies suggest that corporatization was some-
times undertaken as a preliminary step toward privatizing ser-
vices, and regulatory agencies were thus often established at
the same time as corporatization (Foster, 2005). A corpora-
tized utility, it was assumed, would be able to cover its costs
and hence be more attractive to private investors. 33 In many
developing countries, corporatization became the de facto
sector policy for water utilities when it became diﬃcult to
attract private sector interest or after private sector participa-
tion had become politically unpopular. 34 While there is, to
our knowledge, no systematically collected data on the reach
of the corporatization trend, published academic case studies
and policy analyses suggest that at least 35 countries have
engaged in such institutional reforms, as Table 3 indicates.
Importantly, many of these reforms occurred in countries
where W&S were already decentralized.This combination of international and domestic pressures
also prompted many developing countries to experiment with
privatization. The World Bank’s Private Sector Participation
in Infrastructure database, which documents privatization
contracts in all low- and middle-income countries, reports that
61 countries granted at least one privatization contract in
the W&S sector. 35 While service providers with private sector
participation came to serve only 5% of the world’s population
and investors have shown far more interest in middle-income
than low-income countries (Budds & McGranahan, 2003),
the privatization trend has not stopped. Authoritarian regimes
such as China—which possesses the largest number of projects
in Asia—continue to attract investors, and giant countries
such as India and Russia have just begun to roll out national
infrastructure policies emphasizing private sector participa-
tion. 36 As Table 4 demonstrates, as with corporatization,
state and local governments have undertaken the vast majority
of privatizations. 374. EXPERIENCES TO-DATE WITH
DECENTRALIZATION AND INSULATING REFORMS
This section reviews the existing empirical literature on the
eﬀects of decentralization and institutional reforms intended
to increase utility autonomy in the developing world. Our
aim is to evaluate the extent to which the tension we observe
between the rationales for these two reforms has aﬀected pol-
icy implementation. For this reason, we examine cases in
which insulating reforms were adopted subsequent to decen-
tralization, which, as Tables 3 and 4 show, was a common
occurrence. We deliberately separate our discussions of expe-
riences with corporatization (Section 4a) and privatization
(Section 4b). Discussions of these two types of reforms are
often conﬂated in the literature and separate treatment allows
us to highlight that tensions were somewhat greater when
service providers were corporatized rather than privatized.
Our review of the literature reﬂects a comprehensive search
for scholarly analyses of reform experiences undertaken dur-
ing 1990–2013. 38 Existing studies devote suﬃcient attention
to changes in the politics of the W&S sector for us to oﬀer
an initial assessment of whether each reform generated the
political eﬀects hypothesized by their promoters at interna-
tional institutions and donor agencies. 39 As noted previ-
ously, decentralization proponents predicted that citizen
participation would increase, which would enable, among
other things, the introduction of cost recovery policies. The
promoters of insulating reforms, in contrast, assumed that
citizen inﬂuence upon policymaking—mediated through
elected oﬃcials—would decrease, and that this would ease
the introduction of cost recovery policies they viewed as nec-
essary to improve and extend services. Our analysis in this
section thus focuses on whether or not existing studies sug-
gest that the introduction of insulating reforms following
decentralization: (1) increased the managerial and ﬁscal
autonomy of W&S providers; (2) discouraged political
authorities, and especially elected oﬃcials, from intervening
in the setting of consumer rates; (3) reduced civil society
mobilization against rate increases through formal venues
such as courts or informal venues such as street protests,
or conversely, increased user buy-in regarding cost recovery
policies; and (4) discouraged political authorities from back-
ing down following protests against cost recovery policies.
As we will show, the empirical literature to-date suggests the
political eﬀects of decentralization have not matched expecta-
tions. While citizen engagement with W&S policy has at times
CAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BOTH DECENTRALIZE AND DEPOLITICIZE URBAN WATER SERVICES? 629increased, citizen participation has often taken the form of
backlashes against cost recovery policy through informal
channels such as organized protest. Rarely has greater public
involvement increased citizen support for cost recovery poli-
cies. Insulating reforms, when instituted by subnational gov-
ernments, have also failed to generate the political eﬀects
predicted by promoters. Local politicians have strong incen-
tives to cater to consumers’ short-run interests in lower rates
because of re-election concerns and fears of popular unrest,
and thus seek to inﬂuence W&S policy even following the hor-
izontal transfer of administrative functions to independent
providers. Given the weak institutional checks and balances
in the developing world, politicians face few real barriers to
intervening in policymaking by the new, formally independent
bodies created during the reform process.
(a) The political eﬀects of corporatization following
decentralization
One of the main beneﬁts of corporatization, promoters
argued, was that managerial autonomy would increase,
thereby ensuring that utility revenues would not be squan-
dered through patronage employment and other wasteful
expenditures. A number of studies have found that granting
decentralized utilities formal institutional autonomy through
corporatization, however, does not create de facto indepen-
dence from political pressures. Despite formal procedures
designed to ensure that managers are not political appointees,
local politicians continue to circumvent these rules and
directly appoint managers. This phenomenon is particularly
pronounced in decentralized settings in weak institutional
environments where local authorities typically govern without
eﬀective legal or societal counterweights. As a result, utilities
employment often continues to be a valuable patronage
resource for politicians, and at times a source of important
revenue for local coﬀers following corporatization. For exam-
ple, in Colombia and Mexico, mayors and city councils typi-
cally appoint the utility manager and board of directors and
intervene in the hiring decisions and managerial practices of
corporatized utilities (Herrera, 2014; Krause, 2009, pp. 118,
159–160). In Kenya, both local and federal authorities contin-
ued to interfere directly in the operations of corporatized local
utilities despite their formal legal and ﬁscal autonomy
(K’Akumu and Appida, 2006, p. 320). Furthermore, despite
the fact that utility budgets were oﬃcially independent, muni-
cipal oﬃcials continued to access utility funds for non-water-
related purposes, and transferred en masse all personnel from
prior municipal water boards to the new corporatized utilities
without removing patronage appointees (K’Akumu and
Appida, 2006, p. 320; Onjala, 2002, pp. 19–20). In many such
instances, formal institutional changes are insuﬃcient to give
utilities de facto operational autonomy.
Decentralization has also underscored the political salience
of the W&S sector for local politicians. Compared to
national-level counterparts, local oﬃcials tend to have fewer
policy responsibilities, making water policy a top priority,
and they also tend to be particularly sensitive to protestors
who can easily access their local city hall and make their
claims visible. The political sensitivity of tariﬀ increases per-
sists even following corporatization because often voters do
not perceive corporatized water utilities as truly independent.
In the empirical cases surveyed, politicians concerned about
reelection often intervened to block cost recovery policies,
eﬀectively violating the independence of the boards charged
with overseeing service management. In Colombia during
1998–2004, legislators presented at least 10 proposals for prizefreezes (Ferna´ndez, 2004, p. 7). In Bogota´, Colombia, citizens
routinely complained about the cost of water. Meanwhile, pol-
iticians attacked the water utility for “overpricing” in spite of
service improvements enabled by the adoption of cost recov-
ery policies (Gilbert, 2007, p. 1571). For example, in a 2005
survey, 83% of the complaints about water service were about
high tariﬀs (Gilbert, 2007, p. 1571). Herrera reports that in
Mexico, it is not uncommon for mayors to set prices below
costs for fear of social backlash, and to manipulate collection
practices so that price increases are not implemented (2014). In
Kenya, fears of “unfavorable public opinion” from users los-
ing long-standing subsidies through tariﬀ increases have
stalled the adoption of cost recovery policies (Onjala, 2002,
p. 19). Because of the political sensitivity of cost recovery,
local oﬃcials are particularly reluctant to raise prices or sus-
pend services during elections. Gilbert notes that in Colombia,
Mayor Mockus campaigned for oﬃce in Bogota´ by promising
to reduce water tariﬀs by 10% (2007, p. 1563), and in Mexico,
mayors continue to politicize tariﬀ setting during elections
(Pineda Pablos, 2002, p. 67). In Namibian municipalities, 40
mayors have paused service suspensions for non-payment dur-
ing elections (Labour Resource and Research Institute, 2005,
p. 266). Despite the corporatized structure, in many cases fol-
lowing decentralization, concerns about social backlash or los-
ing elections have often interfered with eﬀorts by bureaucrats
to introduce cost recovery policies. 41
Not only did local oﬃcials focus on short-term costs to con-
sumers in their eﬀorts to address citizen concerns, but con-
sumer groups also turned to the courts to block price
increases. Despite the assumption that decentralization would
create greater user buy-in for services, citizens have largely lit-
igated against the adoption of cost recovery policies. For
example, in South Africa, citizens have made eﬀorts to litigate
against tariﬀ increases and services suspensions (Morgan,
2011, pp. 156–157, 160–163). In Johannesburg, South Africa,
activists launched legal challenges to have prepaid meters
declared unconstitutional, and banned (Bakker, 2010, pp.
155–156; Conca, 2006, p. 353; Dugard, 2010; Harvey, 2005).
In Namibia, utility staﬀ members urged community members
to sue the municipality under the premise that service suspen-
sions were illegal; even staﬀ members could not aﬀord the dra-
matic price increases being implemented (Labour Resource
and Research Institute, 2005, p. 266). In Irapuato, Mexico,
over 1,000 consumers ﬁled complaints with the municipal judi-
cial oﬃcial against price increases (Herrera, 2013).
A handful of studies document the creation of formal, insti-
tutional venues following decentralization that were intended
to increase citizen’s voice in the policymaking process outside
of their normal interactions with elected oﬃcials. However,
these studies suggest that participatory councils have been cre-
ated infrequently, and where established, have not resulted in
increased citizen inﬂuence on service provision, particularly
for non-elites. Krause notes that in Colombia, important bar-
riers to forming user councils exist, such as users not knowing
their rights to form councils and the bureaucratic complexity
of creating councils (2009, p. 110). Krause reports that in pub-
lic hearings, user representatives often “lack the legal, techni-
cal, and economic knowledge” to eﬀectively participate in the
decision-making process (2009, pp. 111–112). In Kenya, newly
corporatized utilities have created spaces for civil society on
the board of directors (Onjala, 2002, pp. 16–17), but citizens
have “remained quiet without raising any issue” (K’Akumu,
2007, p. 307). Similarly, in Namibia, decentralization has not
ensured that citizens’ interests are represented, particularly
among the poor who have borne the brunt of service
suspensions (Bayliss, 2008a, p. 230). In contrast, when a board
Table 3. Water and sanitation corporatization in developing countries
Country Service provision by subnational
government?
Institutional structure Examples
Latin America
Argentina Yes (province) Public companies without private capital SAMEEP (Chaco)
Aguas de los Andes (Jujuy)
EPAS (Neuque´n)
Servicios Pu´blicos S.E. (Santa Cruz)
OSSE (San Juan)
Bolivia Yes (local) Public companies without private capital EPSAS La Paz
EPSAS El Alto
Brazil Yes (state and local) Public companies with and without some private
capital
COPASA (Minas Gerais)
SABESP (Sao Paolo)
Colombia Yes (local) Special purpose governments and public companies
with and without some private capital
EAAB (Bogota´)
Aguas de Manizales
EEA Villavicencio
Costa Rica Yes (local) Public company ESPH (Heredia)
Dominican Republic No (deconcentrated to regions) Public companies without private capital CAASD (Santo Domingo)
CORAASAN (Santiago)
CORAAPLATA (Puerto Plata)
Ecuador Yes (local) Public companies without private capital EPMAPS (Quito)
ETAPA (Cuenca)
Guatemala Yes (local) Special purpose governments and public company
without capital
EMPAGUA (Guatemala City)
Honduras Yes (partial) Public company with some private capital Aguas de Puerto Cortes
Mexico Yes (state and local) Special purpose governments and public company
with some private capital
SAPAL (Leo´n)
OAPAS (Naucalpan)
OPDM (Tlalnepantla de Baz)
CESPE (Baja California)
Aguas de Saltillo (Saltillo)
Nicaragua No Public company without private capital ENACAL
Paraguay No Public Company without private capital ESSAP (National)
Peru Yes (province and local) Public Company without private capital SEDAPAL (Lima)
Africa
Benin No Public Company without private capital SONEB
Burkina Faso Yes Public Company without private capital ONEA
Cape Verde Yes Public Company with some private capital ELECTRA
Chad No Public Company without private capital STEE
Cote d’Ivoire No Public Company with some private capital SODECI
Ghana No Public Company without private capital GWC
Kenya Yes (local) Public company without private capital Nyeri W&S Co. Ltd
Nakuru Quality W&S Ltd
Eldoret W&S Co. Ltd
Lesotho Yes Public Company without private capital WASA
Malawi No Public Company without private capital BWB
CRWB
LWB
Mozambique Yes Public Company without private capital AdeM Beira; Nempula; Pemba; Quilimane
Namibia Yes (public national company sells
bulk water to municipalities)
Public company without private capital Namwater LLC
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CAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BOTH DECENTRALIZE AND DEPOLITICIZE URBAN WATER SERVICES? 631of directors was formed in corporatized utilities in Manizales,
Colombia and Leo´n and Saltillo, Mexico, they were domi-
nated by local business elites (de Garza, 2006, pp. 111–112;
Krause, 2009, pp. 157–159; Herrera, 2011, pp. 78–86). User
associations in Saltillo, Mexico have protested that the cor-
poratized utility has excluded civil society (de Garza, 2006,
pp. 122–123). Similarly, Onjala notes that in Kenya, industry
is more represented in decision-making because of its ﬁnan-
cial stake in receiving high-quality water (2002, pp. 22–23).
While there is little documentation of participation through
formal channels, studies highlight the common use of various
non-institutional forms of demandmaking following decentral-
ization and corporatization, such as protest vandalism, illegal
re-connections and collective action. In Lima, Peru, citizens
have resisted attempts to monitor water usage by stealing
and vandalizing water meters with much greater frequency:
whereas 32,256 meters were stolen or vandalized in 2000, this
number increased to 85,176 by 2007 (Ioris, 2012, p. 274). In
Durban and Tygerberg South Africa, citizens reconnected to
networks following service cut-oﬀs for nonpayment
(Morgan, 2011, pp. 156–157; Smith, 2004, p. 389). In a number
of South African cities, a mixture of local and international
activists protested the installation of meters, leading to arrests
and criminal charges (Conca, 2006, p. 353; Harvey, 2005, pp.
122–126). In other cases, price increases and service cut-oﬀs
for non-payment have sparked mass mobilization. Several
studies document organized resistance to payment. For exam-
ple, protestors boycotted payment in Pretoria, South Africa
(Bakker, 2010, p. 154) and in Durban, South Africa, large
crowds rallied in the water utility oﬃces, holding 10 rand to
symbolize the amount they could aﬀord to pay per month
(Morgan, 2011, pp. 156–157). Herrera notes that in a number
of Mexican cities, price increases provoked sit-ins, rallies, and
major protests (2013, 2014). In major South African cities,
backlash against cost recovery policies has been widespread.
For example, Smith writes that high rates of service cut-oﬀs
for nonpayment inTygerberg andCapeTown, “sparked town-
ship revolt, making these areas periodically ungovernable”
(2004, p. 389). Cost recovery policies in Cape Town, Johannes-
burg, and Durban have led to the creation of urban social
movements allied with such diverse causes as labor rights, eco-
nomic justice issues, and environmental protections, which
garnered international support (Conca, 2006, p. 353;
Debbane´ & Keil, 2004, p. 217; Morgan, 2011, pp. 156–157).
Some studies note that local corporatized utilities have
repealed or backtracked on cost recovery policies due to their
contentiousness. In Zambia, Dagdeverin reports price
increases that doubled tariﬀs for middle-class users and more
than quadrupled tariﬀs for low-income users became politi-
cally untenable and were soon lowered. Although rates were
later increased, they remain the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa,
despite the aﬀordability of tariﬀs for many residents
(Dagdeviren, 2008a, p. 108). In Nakuru, Kenya, conﬂicts
over outstanding water debts between institutions and a gen-
eral lack of political support for cost recovery led to the dis-
solution of the corporatized utility (Onjala, 2002, pp. 20–21).
Smith notes that township revolts over service suspensions in
Tygerberg and Cape Town, South Africa led authorities to
temporarily halt suspensions (2004, p. 389). In Poza Rica,
Mexico, lawsuits brought against the water utility forced
greater leniency in service suspension policies, and organized
protest led the mayor to insist on price freezes for three
years—prices were only increased with the arrival of a new
mayor (Herrera, 2011, 157–164). Herrera notes that in
instances in which price increases sparked civic unrest
throughout Mexico, politicians frequently pressured
Table 4. Water and sanitation privatization in developing countries, 1990–2011
Tier of government privatizing
Country National State/provincial Local N/Aa Type of privatizationb
Totals 90 87 504 87 295 Concessions, 29 divestitures, 317 greenﬁeld projects, 127
management or lease contracts
Latin America
Argentina 1 14 4 18 Concessions, 1 management or lease contract
Belize 1 1 Divestiture
Bolivia 1 1 2 Concessions
Brazil 7 35 40 66 Concessions, 4 divestitures, 12 greenﬁeld projects
Chile 14 1 6 11 Concessions, 7 divestitures, 3 greenﬁeld projects
Colombia 2 12 25 12 27 Concessions, 2 greenﬁeld projects, 22 management or lease contracts
Cuba 1 1 Concession
Ecuador 1 1 2 2 Concessions, 2 management or lease contracts
Guatemala 1 1 Concession
Guyana 1 1 Management or lease contract
Haiti 1 1 management or lease contract
Honduras 1 1 Concession
Mexico 1 13 8 9 5 Concessions, 25 greenﬁeld projects, 1 management or lease contract
Panama 1 1 Greenﬁeld project
Peru 3 1 1 Concession, 2 greenﬁeld projects
Uruguay 2 2 Concessions
Venezuela, RB 1 4 3 Greenﬁeld projects, 3 management or lease contracts
Africa and Middle East
Algeria 14 9 Greenﬁeld projects, 5 management or lease contracts
Cameroon 1 1 Management or lease contract
Central African Republic 1 1 Management or lease contract
Congo, Rep. 1 1 Management or lease contract
Coˆte d’Ivoire 1 1 Management or lease contract
Egypt 2 1 Greenﬁeld project, 1 management or lease contract
Ghana 1 1 Management or lease contract
Jordan 3 1 2 Greenﬁeld projects, 2 management or lease contracts
Lebanon 1 1 Management or lease contract
Kenya 1 1 Management or lease contract
Mauritius 1 1 Management or lease contract
Mozambique 2 2 Management or lease contracts
Namibia 1 1 Management or lease contract
Niger 1 1 Management or lease contract
Senegal 1 1 Management or lease contract
South Africa 8 2 Concessions, 1 greenﬁeld project, 5 management or lease contracts
Sudan 1 1 Greenﬁeld project
Tanzania 1 1 Management or lease contract
Tunisia 1 1 greenﬁeld project
Uganda 2 2 Management or lease contract
West Bank and Gaza 2 2 Management or lease contracts
Zambia 1 1 Management or lease contract
Asia
China 3 8 358 5 112 Concessions, 11 divestitures, 232 greenﬁeld projects, 19
management or lease contracts
India 6 6 3 Concessions, 4 greenﬁeld projects, 5 management or lease contracts
Indonesia 10 7 Concessions, 3 greenﬁeld projects
Malaysia 2 11 3 11 concessions, 1 divestiture, 2 greenﬁeld projects, 2 management or
lease contracts
Nepal 1 1 Management or lease contract
Papua New Guinea 1 1 Concession
Philippines 4 2 5 Concessions, 1 management or lease contract
Thailand 2 9 5 9 Concessions, 1 divestiture, 5 greenﬁeld projects, 1 management or
lease contract
Vietnam 2 1 3 Greenﬁeld projects
Central Asia and Europe
Albania 2 1 1 Concession, 2 management or lease contracts
Armenia 9 1 10 Management or lease contracts
Azerbaijan 1 1 Management or lease contract
Bulgaria 1 1 Concession
Georgia 1 1 Divestiture
Kazakhstan 1 1 Divestiture
632 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 4— (continued)
Tier of government privatizing
Country National State/provincial Local N/Aa Type of privatizationb
Kosovo 1 1 Management or lease contract
Kyrgyz Republic 1 1 Management or lease contract
Montenegro 1 1 Management or lease contract
Romania 3 1 3 Concessions, 1 management or lease contract
Russia 3 18 1 2 Concessions, 2 divestitures, 4 greenﬁeld projects, 14 management or
lease contracts
Turkey 2 1 Greenﬁeld project, 1 management or lease contract
Ukraine 1 2 1 Concession, 2 management or lease contracts
Uzbekistan 1 1 Management or lease contract
Source: PPIAF-World Bank, PPI Database, (ppi.worldbank.org). Data downloaded February 14, 2013.
aN/A refers to cases in which the database does not have information regarding the tier of government privatizing for a particular project.
bDivestitures are privatizations through the purchase of a majority stake in a state-owned enterprise by a private entity. Concessions involve private sector
management and investment in a state-owned system for a given period. Greenﬁeld projects involve the construction and operation of a new infrastructure
facility for a pre-speciﬁed period by a private entity or public–private joint venture. Under management and lease contracts, a private entity takes over the
management of a state-owned provider for a ﬁxed period, but investment responsibilities remain with the state.
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grams, periodic price freezes, and allowing some low-income
neighborhoods to not pay for water (2011, 2014). These con-
cessions allowed some cost recovery policies to be imple-
mented. Taken together, our analysis of the cases described
in the literature suggests that corporatization has failed to
insulate service providers from political pressures, and that
such pressures have often prevented the adoption of cost
recovery strategies intended to help utilities escape from a
“vicious cycle” of underperformance. Increased citizen inﬂu-
ence in service provision following decentralization, in other
words, has had the opposite eﬀect from that suggested by
decentralization proponents. Not only have decentralization
proponents’ expectations not been realized, but also the
political changes triggered by decentralization appear to have
prevented corporatization from increasing provider
independence.
(b) The political eﬀects of privatization following
decentralization
According to the proponents of insulating reforms, private
sector participation would more eﬀectively insulate service
provision from political intervention than corporatization.
Moreover, the fact that foreign investors often had access to
international arbitration if governments reneged on their com-
mitments oﬀered them further protection, it was assumed,
from political decisions to backtrack on contractual commit-
ments. The existing empirical literature on privatization does
suggest that more formal insulation from electoral politics
allowed privatized water utilities to achieve greater opera-
tional independence and introduce more cost recovery policies
than their public sector predecessors. This being said, our
review of the literature to-date suggests that local politicians’
electoral concerns still prompted them to regularly inﬂuence
regulated, private provision—especially with respect to the
timing of rate hikes and other politically sensitive cost recov-
ery policies—though not to the same extent as under corpora-
tization. This was especially true when privatization followed
decentralization, which increased the salience of water policy
for local politicians given the small number of policy areas
treated at the local level. As in the case of corporatization,
when decentralization preceded privatization, electoral
concerns or fears of unrest often prompted political authori-
ties to block, rather than encourage, the implementation of
cost recovery measures—contrary to the expectations ofdecentralization proponents. In addition, when social protest
erupted against the adoption of rate hikes or other cost recov-
ery policies following privatization, it resonated even more
strongly than under corporatization due to the fact that ser-
vices were provided by a private ﬁrm with a proﬁt motive that
served as a convenient punching bag for local oﬃcials. 42
Operational independence in areas such as the hiring and ﬁr-
ing of workers and the management of utility revenues does
appear to have increased following privatization according to
the few studies that address the topic. Privatizations often
involved large layoﬀs or voluntary retirement programs:
large-N studies of the eﬀects of privatization point to large,
up-front reductions in the number of employees per connection
(Andre´s, Guasch, Haven, & Foster, 2008, pp. 166–171; Marin,
2009, pp. 96–99; Shirley & Me´nard, 2002, pp. 29–30). 43 Such
large reductions would not have been feasible if privatized util-
ities were still highly susceptible to pressures for patronage
employment. 44 Other aspects of operational autonomy, such
as budgeting, have received less attention in the literature.
Based on a comparison of four municipal utilities in Colombia,
Krause (2009, p. 176) argues that privatization via a concession
or lease contract limited politicians’ access to providers’ ﬁnan-
cial resources, though he notes that a corporatized provider in
Colombia also achieved operational independence.
While privatized service providers appear to enjoy greater
operational independence than their public sector predeces-
sors, case studies suggest that politicians routinely block cost
recovery measures such as consumer rate increases due to elec-
toral concerns. Political intervention in rate setting, which is
typically delegated to regulatory agencies or companies them-
selves through legislation or contracts, is particularly likely
when services are regulated by state or municipal governments
and during competitive elections. 45 Local politicians blocked
rate increases for concessionaires in Mexico City and Aguasc-
alientes, Mexico out of electoral concerns (Wilder & Romero
Lankao, 2006, p. 1984). Analysts observed similar dynamics
in Limeira, Brazil (Vargas, 2008, p. 34). Local candidates for
oﬃce from six political parties signed a joint statement protest-
ing the initial 35% average rate increase in Cochabamba, Boli-
via, following privatization (Nickson & Vargas, 2002, p.
114). 46 In Argentina following privatization, incumbent
governors concerned about reelection for themselves or their
party postponed rate increases and updates to the cadastral
registries upon which tariﬀ calculations were based in the prov-
inces of Salta and Mendoza (Post, 2014a, pp. 84, 121). Gover-
nors were particularly loath to preside over increases if they
634 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthemselves had campaigned on an anti-privatization platform
or when concerns about political competition coincided with
major service quality problems, as occurred in the provinces
of Tucuma´n and Buenos Aires (Post, 2014a, pp. 88, 93).
Case studies suggest that economic crises also prompt politi-
cians to freeze consumer rates, often through the suspension or
renegotiation of privatization contracts. In Aguascalientes,
Mexico, the 1994 peso crisis inspired calls for the cancellation
of the city’s concession contract and encouraged the Aguasc-
alientes mayor to block a rate increase. This led to concession-
aire-government negotiations over a reconﬁguration of
contractual responsibilities (Caldera Ortega, 2006, pp. 2–5;
Pineda Pablos, 1999, pp. 60–62). Argentina’s 2001–02 eco-
nomic crises prompted the county’s national government,
and subsequently all provincial governments, to freeze con-
sumer rates and open up existing utility concession con-
tracts—including those in the water sector—for renegotiation
(Post, 2014a, pp. 88, 93; Post, 2014b, p. 117). Requests made
by the two concessionaires for the Jakarta, Indonesia system
for rate increases following the Asian economic crisis were
rebuﬀed, and contract renegotiation processes ensued (Argo
& Laquian, 2004, p. 13; Bakker, 2010, p. 127). 47 The frequency
with which oﬃcials blocked rate increases suggests that citizens
expect local politicians to intervene in rate-setting despite the
fact that formally independent regulatory institutions are oﬃ-
cially charged with setting consumer prices. Moreover, it
appears that local politicians’ actions are clearly focused on
consumers’ immediate concerns regarding rate increases that
would erode their real income rather than consumers’ long-
run interests in funding investments that could potentially yield
economic, social, and health beneﬁts in the future.
Concerns about political stability and election outcomes have
also led politicians and judges—who do not enjoy high levels of
independence in weak institutional environments—to block
other types of cost recovery policies. While privatization con-
tracts commonly require ﬁrms to install household water
meters, local oﬃcials have often blocked their introduction. 48
Case studies note instances in which judges have blocked the
implementation of cost recovery measures, even when explicitly
provided for in privatization contracts; the Indonesian courts
blocked rate increases in Jakarta following the Asian crisis
(Argo & Laquian, 2004, p. 14), and Argentine courts blocked
the implementation of service cut-oﬀs for nonpayment (Post,
2014a, pp. 97, 115). Privatized utilities have at times responded
to these barriers to the implementation of cost recovery poli-
cies—and the resulting impact on revenues—by lobbying for
revisions to their contracts so as to reconﬁgure their
revenue stream 49 or lower investment requirements. 50
While it is clear that electoral concerns have led local politi-
cians to block some cost recovery policies, this has not fully
hindered their introduction. An econometric study comparing
prices before and after privatization for 49 developing country
utilities reports average real rate increases of 15.7% during the
transition from public to private provision and 24% after the
transition (Andre´s et al., 2008, p. 174). Moreover, collection
eﬃciency, or the percentage of billed charges actually received,
improved in 14 out of 16 Latin American concession contracts
examined in another World Bank study (Marin, 2009, pp. 4,
90–91). Examining systems in sub-Saharan Africa, Bayliss
(2003, pp. 520–521) observes that privatized utilities discon-
nected customers for nonpayment in Senegal and Coˆte
d’Ivoire. This suggests that privatization and the establishment
of regulatory agencies provide some insulation from “politici-
zation,” although less so during tight elections or periods when
authorities are otherwise concerned about their hold on power.
While decentralization proponents argued that bringingservices closer to the people would help build public support
for cost recovery policies, the opposite dynamic appears to
be at work: when local politicians desire to cater to voters or
quell unrest, they block the adoption of such policies.
The existing case study literature also highlights many
instances in which social protests have erupted against privati-
zation or the subsequent introduction of cost recovery
measures. Bakker (2010, pp. 140–141) documents 38 anti-
privatization protest episodes in developing countries across
a range of income levels—a ﬁgure that is probably a conserva-
tive estimate. Protest organizers typically highlight a contra-
diction between citizens’ human right to water and service
provision by private monopolies that earn proﬁts through
charging for services—a juxtaposition that one cannot make
when the public sector charges for services. When contracts
have been granted at the subnational level, these protests
can take center stage due to their visibility and the importance
of water services to local policymakers. In some cases, protests
gained suﬃcient momentum that local oﬃcials chose to delay
or refrain from privatizing services, as occurred in Delhi, India
(Bywater, 2012); Naucalpan, Mexico (Conde Bonﬁl, 1996, pp.
104–109); Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Honduras (Goldman,
2005, p. 259). Nonpayment campaigns and street protests
against the introduction of cost recovery policies such as
metering can also lead ﬁrms to reduce levels of investment dra-
matically, as occurred in Nelspruit, South Africa (Smith,
Gillett, Mottiar, & White, 2005). In a few cases, popular pro-
tests following privatization made it politically expedient for
governments to cancel (or fail to renew) contracts
following consumer rate hikes or severe service quality prob-
lems. 51 The most widely cited case is the Cochabamba conces-
sion in Bolivia, which only attracted one bidder because the
ambitiousness of the required investment program necessi-
tated a large consumer rate hike, which in turn prompted a
wave of social protest that forced the government to cancel
the contract, and ultimately brought a new political movement
to power at the national level (Assies, 2003; Nickson &
Vargas, 2002; Perreault, 2006; Schultz, 2008; Silva, 2009,
chap. 5; Spronk & Webber, 2007). Street protests and massive
consumer nonpayment campaigns also prompted subnational
governments to cancel concession contracts in two Argentine
provinces: Tucuma´n (Giarracca & Del Pozo, 2005; Morgan,
2011, pp. 133–138) and Buenos Aires (Goldman, 2005,
p. 259; Post, 2014a, p. 90). 52 These instances of popular pro-
test stand in contrast to predictions made by proponents of
service decentralization in two respects. First, participation
appears to have increased, but through non-institutionalized
venues. Second, this participation clearly challenges, rather
than supports, the adoption of cost recovery policies intended
to help utilities exit a low-level equilibrium. While the distribu-
tional concerns these protests highlight are important, they
oﬀer no concrete alternative proposals regarding how services
improvements might otherwise be funded.
Our review suggests that existing research on the eﬀects of
corporatization and private sector participation following
decentralization highlights a common pattern: institutional
reforms intended to shield service providers from everyday pol-
itics operated in tension with higher levels of political and
social interest in the W&S sector following decentralization.
While one of the main theoretical arguments used to promote
decentralization was that consumers would be more likely to
support cost recovery reforms adopted by local providers they
could monitor easily, case study research on both types of
reform suggests the opposite. Local politicians often blocked
such reforms when worried about reelection or social protest.
While corporatized providers and regulatory agencies were
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late these entities from political inﬂuence. At the same time,
somewhat diﬀerent forms of politicization arose under corpo-
ratization and privatization. Under corporatization, elected
oﬃcials continued to intervene regularly in management,
whereas under privatization, operators enjoyed greater mana-
gerial autonomy yet still faced strong barriers to the introduc-
tion of cost recovery policies.
These results match expectations of institutionalist
approaches to political economy, which stress that reforms
providing for de jure “independence” for institutions such as
central banks and regulatory agencies are more likely to pro-
vide de facto independence when the political system contains
strong checks and balances (Keefer & Stasavage, 2002; Levy
& Spiller, 1993; Moser, 1999). Our thorough review of IFI
publications of the 1990s suggests that while institutions were
careful to argue that privatization was only likely to succeed
in the presence of eﬀective and independent judiciaries, similar
caveats were not made with respect to corporatization or the
introduction of cost recovery policies. 53 In fact, both privati-
zation and corporatization were adopted in many countries
without strong checks and balances, very often with IFI assis-
tance. In 13 of the 35 countries engaging in corporatization
cited in Table 3, standard measures for “checks and balances”
in the political system fall below average levels as measured by
World Bank database on political institutions (Beck, Clarke,
Groﬀ, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001). Meanwhile, 25 out of 57 low-
and middle-income countries that privatized urban W&S sys-
tems possess below-average checks and balances scores. 545. CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
Institutional reform initiatives in the W&S sector in devel-
oping countries promised to correct incentive problems that
trapped service providers in a vicious cycle of underperfor-
mance. Policy analyses published by IFIs and major donors
promoted institutional changes designed to separate service
provision from political intervention, arguing that such polit-
ical insulation would allow service providers to enact cost
recovery policies that forced consumers to shoulder short-term
costs in order to ﬁnance infrastructure investments yielding
beneﬁts in the medium to long run. Meanwhile, analysts sug-
gested that decentralizing the administration of urban W&S
systems would make service providers more accountable to
the populations they served and help ensure greater commu-
nity support for reforms, including cost recovery measures.
In this paper, we show that the principal rationale used to
promote decentralization and institutional reforms intended
to insulate service providers from politics conﬂict with one
another. Decentralizing reforms were intended to increase
voter and civil society participation in administering services,
whereas reforms such as corporatization and privatization
were intended to insulate utility managers from everyday
political pressures so that controversial cost recovery reforms
could be introduced. While the relative weight placed upon
these two institutional reform initiatives often diﬀered between
and at times even within institutions, both initiatives were
nonetheless promoted in tandem, despite the incompatibility
of their underlying rationale.
We provide the most comprehensive documentation to-date
of both reform waves, and highlight the fact that decentraliza-
tion and insulating reforms were often adopted in tandem in
spite of these conﬂicting rationales. Our review of the existing
literature evaluating the eﬀects of both types of reformssuggests that the tensions we highlight were borne out in prac-
tice, consistent with the expectations of political economy the-
ories predicting that political “independence” will be diﬃcult
to create simply by forming new institutions in political sys-
tems with few checks and balances. Following decentraliza-
tion, local politicians faced strong incentives to intervene
directly in water policy to block the implementation of cost
recovery reforms because of electoral concerns and to respond
to social protests. When consumers mobilized, they did so to
protest, rather than support, cost recovery policies—contrary
to what decentralization proponents suggested.
Our ﬁndings have a number of practical and theoretical
implications, and suggest fruitful lines for future research.
First, our analysis rests upon ﬁndings from disparate case
studies and large-N analyses that use a variety of methodolo-
gies, reﬂecting the interdisciplinary and uncoordinated charac-
ter of research eﬀorts on W&S policy. Further empirical
research on the eﬀects of the reform waves we examine here
should employ similar metrics for multiple cases. Cases should
be chosen so as to isolate key variables of interest, such as
whether or not decentralized utilities instituted advisory coun-
cils for citizen participation, and characteristics of the socio-
economic environment. Future research could also explore
whether providing consumers with more speciﬁc information
about the long-run beneﬁts of speciﬁc infrastructural invest-
ments would increase their willingness to incur short-run costs
such as rate increases.
Second, our analysis suggests that policymakers in the devel-
oping world should be wary of implementing both decentraliza-
tion and insulating reforms in sectors like W&S as
decentralization may make it diﬃcult to insulate service provi-
sion in practice. In particular, decentralization may ensure that
insulating reforms do not provide for suﬃcient political space
for the adoption of cost recovery policies. We hypothesize,
however, that these tensions will be particularly strong when
decentralizing to small jurisdictions. Studies that have exam-
ined the eﬀects of decentralization in the W&S sector in the
absence of insulating reforms argue that decentralization is
more likely to improve service provision if responsibilities are
transferred to jurisdictions with suﬃcient economies of scale.
These analyses emphasize weaker state capacity in small towns
and cities (Asthana, 2012), reduced opportunities for cross-sub-
sidization between income groups (Jouravlev, 2004, pp. 33–34;
Verge`s, 2010, p. 14), and reduced economies of scale (Kitonsa
& Schwartz, 2012, pp. 178–179; OECD, 2011, p. 67). We pro-
pose an additional reason why decentralization to smaller juris-
dictions would increase politicization: with fewer economies of
scale and opportunities for cross-subsidization, policies that
can move local utilities to cost recovery would require asking
the population, and particularly the poor, to pay much higher
prices for service provision than they might otherwise. In other
words, social equity concerns are particularly important in such
cases. This is likely to make policies very politically conten-
tious, which can often prevent their introduction. Following
a similar logic, we would expect tensions between the two
reform initiatives to be greater in poorer countries and in coun-
tries with higher levels of income inequality.
Furthermore, our survey of this policy area underscores the
importance of understanding the ways in which institutional
models “borrowed” from the industrialized world can function
in diﬀerent and unanticipated ways in the developing world. In
particular, we draw attention to the importance of anticipating
interaction eﬀects between diﬀerent types of reforms in new
settings. For example, under the institutionalist turn in devel-
opment policy, many types of reforms were promoted in tan-
dem. W&S is just one policy area that witnessed multiple
636 WORLD DEVELOPMENTinstitutional reforms during this period. Many Latin American
countries, for instance, both decentralized and partially priv-
atized health services during this period (Haggard &
Kaufman, 2008, pp. 300–301). Some countries both decentral-
ized and partially privatized primary and secondary education
as well (Cue´llar-Marchelli, 2003; Parry, 1997). Future research
could examine explicitly how institutional interactions aﬀected
reform outcomes in these and other cases.
Finally, our ﬁndings imply that certain theoretical argu-
ments regarding the likely eﬀects of decentralization are more
plausible than others—at least for local public services like
water. Our analysis suggests that participation is indeed likely
to increase when a service is decentralized because it mustcompete with fewer other issue areas for voter and politician
attention. This being said, citizen mobilization is likely to
focus on preventing tariﬀ increases and service cut-oﬀs—which
constitute concrete, short-run losses for consumers—rather
than on encouraging investments in longer term projects that
may not yield the beneﬁts politicians promise with certainty.
The balance of the case study evidence on W&S reforms sug-
gests participation does not help raise consumer consciousness
about the importance of planning and resource constraints,
nor does it seem to increase political support for the adoption
of cost recovery policies. We encourage scholars of decentral-
ization to examine whether or not similar dynamics are visible
in other policy areas.NOTES1. Andrews (2013) documents this broader trend.
2. “Cost recovery policies” refers to revenue and collection policies
intended to allow service providers to fund a greater percentage of their
expenditures out of revenue from consumers. Typical policies include
consumer rate increases, eliminating clandestine connections, and sus-
pending service in response to nonpayment.
3. Even after the decentralization wave of the last decades, most
subnational—and particularly municipal—governments in the developing
world have administrative responsibilities for a relatively small set of
services. Typically, subnational responsibilities are limited to urban
planning, primary and secondary education, basic social services, public
health, water and sanitation, public transport, and waste management
(World Bank and United Cities and Local Governments, 2008).4. As scholars have noted, individuals tend to be risk averse, and—given
a choice between avoiding certain losses and obtaining larger beneﬁts in
the future with some degree of uncertainty—often prefer avoiding certain
losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Pierson, 1996).5. See PAHO (2001, pp. 23–24) on Latin America.
6. For a nearly complete set of coverage estimates for 1962, see Dieterich
and Henderson (1963, pp. 78–81).
7. Yepes (1992, pp. 2–3, 15) and Corrales (2004, p. 49) summarize the
Latin American experience. World Bank (1991, p. 25) describes this
tendency across developing countries, quoting an African minister of
construction: “Construct big, beautiful, and forever.” See also Black
(1998, p. 31).
8. Country and region-speciﬁc case studies suggest this was a common
phenomenon: see Yepes (1992, p. 15) and Corrales (2004, p. 49) on Latin
America; World Bank (1964, p. 2) on Mexico; Nickson and Franceys
(2003, pp. 42–43) on Ghana; Nilsson and Kaijser (2009, p. 279), on Kenya
and Uganda; Bayliss (2008a, p. 227), on Namibia; and Nickson and
Franceys (2003, pp. 45–46) on Sri Lanka.
9. Jaglin (2002, pp. 234–235) describes this phenomena in sub-Saharan
Africa.
10. See Corrales (2004, p. 49) on Latin America; Nickson and Franceys
(2003, pp. 42–43), on Ghana; Nilsson and Kaijser (2009, p. 279) on East
Africa; Swatuk (2005, p. 47) on Southern Africa; Nickson and Franceys
(2003, pp. 45–46) on Sri Lanka. In China, the central government
maintained low water tariﬀs until the reform era (Zhong & Mol, 2008, p.
899).11. Corrales (2004, p. 49) describes the Latin American case. According
to Smith (2004, p. 377), post-independence governments in Africa were
never able to subsidize their W&S parastatals suﬃciently, in part because
they were formed later than in other regions and thus were trying to
expand services in a more diﬃcult economic context.
12. See U.N. Habitat (2001, pp. 122–124) regarding inaccuracies in the
standard cross-national data sources on service access and problems with
service continuity and water quality in areas with coverage.
13. The policy consensus that had formed behind decentralization by the
mid-1990s is conveyed in a variety of policy documents and discussion
papers published by the major donors in the sector. Arguments for
decentralization are most strongly articulated in documents addressing
integrated water resources management (IWRM) and emphasize the
importance of local participation, and thus consider the reform of urban
utilities within a broader framework. References in World Bank publica-
tions include World Bank (1993, pp. 10–11, 1994a, pp. 4, 11, 1994b, p. 76),
Fox (1994, p. 54), and Black (1998, pp. 31, 64). See also U.N. Habitat
(1993, p. 8). Regarding US AID support, see Walker and Vela´squez
(1999a, pp. 43–44).
14. The political science literature distinguishes between three types of
decentralization from central to subnational governments: political, ﬁscal,
and administrative (see Falleti (2010) and Montero and Samuels (2004)).
Our analysis focuses on administrative decentralization, or the vertical
transfer of policymaking and managerial functions in speciﬁc policy areas,
to subnational governments.
15. Conca (2006, p. 158) highlights some of the tensions within the
IWRM community regarding the extent to which user participation
should be encouraged. According to Walker and Vela´squez (1999a, pp.
44–45), for instance, US AID emphasized decentralization whereas the
Inter-American Development Bank emphasized reforms designed to
insulate service providers from politics. USAID (2000, pp. 2, 14, 17)
describes how W&S funding has ﬁt within the agency’s broader emphasis
upon decentralization as means of promoting democratization. Eaton,
Kaiser, and Smoke (2011, pp. xix, 47) note that such diﬀerences were
common throughout the donor community’s decentralization initiatives,
and that they often posed diﬃculties for developing countries.
16. Principle No. 2 of the Dublin Principles argues that a decentralized,
participatory approach should increase awareness of the importance of
water. While the Dublin Principles addressed the management of entire
national water systems, framers intended the principles to apply to urban
water utilities as well as river basin management, irrigation systems, etc.
17. Regulatory and provider roles would be separated within a three-
tiered system, thereby addressing the “poacher-gamekeeper” problem.
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varied by country. For example, international pressures were important in
the Mexican case (Wilder, 2010; Herrera, 2014), whereas Argentina’s
military government made a relatively independent decision to
decentralize in the early 1980s (Post, 2014a, p. 43).
19. The table includes both water and sanitation services, as they are
typically managed by the same provider. Thus, they were often
decentralized at the same time, and the few cases in which the subsectors
were decentralized separately are marked as such in Table 2.
20. This deﬁnition is restrictive, and does not account for all of the
decentralizing and/or municipalizing eﬀorts that have occurred through-
out the world. For example, in Brazil, military regimes centralized water
provision under state-level governments during the 1970s, and recent
eﬀorts to municipalize services provision have been considered by some to
be decentralization eﬀorts, even though no national-level parastatal
delivered services (Sabbioni, 2008, p. 13).
21. By deconcentration we refer to the creation of regional oﬃces for
service delivery that remain under the auspices of the federal government.
22. See Walker and Vela´squez (1999a, p. 18) regarding deconcentration
eﬀorts in Central America.
23. See Foster (1996, p. 2), an analysis published by the Inter-American
Development Bank, and Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995, p. 9), a World
Bank-sponsored publication promoting privatization in the W&S sector.
The World Bank’s 1994 World Development Report articulated the same
points for infrastructure sectors in general (1994b, pp. 7, 33, 39, 75). See
also World Bank (1993, p. 22). For the Asian Development Bank’s
perspective, see McIntosh (2003, chap. 8). See also Savedoﬀ and Spiller
(1999, chap. 1).
24. The tendency of government agencies to both provide services and
conduct “policing” roles in the sector, such as determining sector-wide
policies governing service provision and monitoring utility compliance
performance standards is often conceptualized as a “poacher-gamekeeper”
problem in these documents (e.g., Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995, p. 9),
Foster (1996, p. 2)).
25. Krueger (1974) is the classic statement of this perspective. On state-
owned enterprise performance, see Islam (1993, p. 131), Kikeri, Nellis, and
Shirley (1992, p. 13), and Shirley (1999).
26. Most deﬁnitions of corporatization focus on legal and ﬁnancial
autonomy of service providers from government. Corporatized entities
also typically have a corporatized governance structure, with a board of
directors overseeing company management. While some scholars and
policy analysts restrict the deﬁnition to public companies incorporated
under private law, others extend the deﬁnition to include public law
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